The dominant unspoken philosophical basis of medical care in the United States is a form of Cartesian reductionism that views the body as a machine and medical professionals as technicians whose job is to repair that machine. The purpose of this paper is to advocate for an alternative philosophy of medicine based on the concept of healing relationships between clinicians and patients. This is accomplished first by exploring the ethical and philosophical work of Pellegrino and Thomasma and then by connecting (...) Martin Buber's philosophical work on the nature of relationships to an empirically derived model of the medical healing relationship. The Healing Relationship Model was developed by the authors through qualitative analysis of interviews of physicians and patients. Clinician-patient healing relationships are a special form of what Buber calls I-Thou relationships, characterized by dialog and mutuality, but a mutuality limited by the inherent asymmetry of the clinician-patient relationship. The Healing Relationship Model identifies three processes necessary for such relationships to develop and be sustained: Valuing, Appreciating Power and Abiding. We explore in detail how these processes, as well as other components of the model resonate with Buber's concepts of I-Thou and I-It relationships. The resulting combined conceptual model illuminates the wholeness underlying the dual roles of clinicians as healers and providers of technical biomedicine. On the basis of our analysis, we argue that health care should be focused on healing, with I-Thou relationships at its core. (shrink)

In “Understanding Demonstratives”, Gareth Evans bites the bullet regarding Rip van Winkle cases in cognitive dynamics: the fact that Rip sleeps for twenty years and completely loses track of time means he is unable to retain his original belief that “Today is a fine day”. In this paper, the author argues that Evans need not bite this bullet because there are resources in his account of the cognitive dynamics involved in belief retention developed in The Varieties of Reference to successfully (...) confront the challenge posed by the Rip van Winkle case. In particular, when we combine the two central elements of Evans’s cognitive dynamics – the skill of keeping track of one’s spatio-temporal location in addition to memory – it is possible to arrive at the conclusion that it is indeed possible for Rip to retain and re-express his original belief. (shrink)

It is widely held that reflexivity is the defining feature of selfhood: the ability of the self to stand in a certain relation to itself. The question of how exactly to theorize this self-relation, however, has been the source of ongoing debate. In recent years, Kantian and post-Kantian approaches such as Christine Korsgaard’s constitutivism and Richard Moran’s commitment view, have attempted to establish the priority of the agential over the epistemic self-relation, thereby re-orientating the debate away from metaphysics and epistemology (...) towards ethics and moral psychology. Despite the important progress they make towards a de-alienated and reified understanding of the self-relation, however, I argue that the Kantian paradigm is ultimately inadequate because its methodological individualism makes it incapable of accounting for the irreducibly social dimension of the self-relation and, therefore, of successfully making the transition from ethics to social and political philosophy. In other words, an adequate ontology of the self-relation is possible only as a social ontology. In order to motivate this thesis, I appeal to two examples that expose the “social deficit” of the Kantian approach: Frantz Fanon’s phenomenology of race/racism in “The Lived Experience of the Black” and the phenomenon of cultural collapse in Jonathan Lear’s Radical Hope. I then go on to provide a sketch of an alternative approach based on the notion of “self-appropriation”, distinguishing it from Rahel Jaeggi’s use of the term in her recent critique of alienation, in the process. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIn recent work, Maeve Cooke has criticised Jürgen Habermas’s post-metaphysical model in order to motivate an alternative “post-secular” conception of the state, which involves the replacement of the “institutional translation proviso” with the “nonauthoritarian reasoning requirement”. I provide a qualified defence of the Habermasian model by arguing that it does not lead to the kind of negative consequences regarding legitimacy and solidarity Cooke attributes to it. This, in turn, means that Cooke’s proposal for the secular foundation of political authority on (...) a post-secular basis is insufficiently motivated. In the process, I argue that the point of departure for the debate about religion in the public sphere shared by both Habermas and Cooke – the picture of the “total” religious citizen – should be rejected because it presupposes an overly simplistic view of religions and religious identities. (shrink)

This article is concerned with the question of the relative priority between political and social ontology within left-Heideggerianism, a tradition recently reconstructed by Oliver Marchart. Although the title seems to imply that this question is an open and live one within left-Heideggerianism – that the two paths at the crossroads have been clearly delineated when, in fact, the current predicament of left-Heideggerianism resembles more a one-way street – this is somewhat misleading: the identification of left-Heideggerianism with a post-foundationalist political ontology (...) that enjoys systematic priority over the social has contributed to the suppression of the question of the Being of the social and, therefore, prevented a critical re-examination of its relationship to the political. The aim of this article is both modest and ambitious: modest, in that it merely seeks to pose and motivate the question of the social within left-Heideggerianism both at an exegetical and at a systematic level; ambiti... (shrink)

In Another Philosophy of History, J.G. Herder claims that his aim is not to compare and judge different cultures, but merely to describe and explain how each came into being and thus to adopt the standpoint of an impartial observer. I argue, however, that there is a tension between Herder's understanding of his own project—his stated doctrine of historicism and cultural relativism—and the way in which it is actually put into practice. That is, despite Herder's stated aims, he is nevertheless (...) unable to avoid justifying premodern forms of life and making context-transcending evaluative judgments in the process of trying to understand cultures on their own terms and holding them up as exemplars vis à vis the Enlightenment. This tension presents the challenge of accounting for it in the most charitable and illuminating way. I argue that this goal can be achieved by appealing to the resources of the philosophical hermeneutics of Hans-Georg Gadamer, which enables us to disclose two enabling conditions for Herder's project of which he was not explicitly aware, viz., the internal connection between understanding and justification and the enabling character of prejudice as the condition for the possibility of understanding as such. (shrink)

In spite of his status as a highly original thinker whose views were, in many ways, ahead of his time and anticipate those of more famous successors, the work of Johann Gottfried von Herder has not received the attention it deserves in mainstream philosophical discourse. In Herder's Hermeneutics, Kristin Gjesdal successfully addresses this deficit by exploring the enlightenment origins of the hermeneutic tradition through a careful and compelling reconstruction of Herder's theory of interpretation. Breaking with the widespread view of Herder (...) as a contra-Enlightenment thinker, Gjesdal conceives of Herder's hermeneutics as contributing to the enlightenment of the Enlightenment project through an immanent critique of... (shrink)

It is often assumed that engaging in a one‐on‐one dialogue with a tutor is more effective than listening to a lecture or reading a text. Although earlier experiments have not always supported this hypothesis, this may be due in part to allowing the tutors to cover different content than the noninteractive instruction. In 7 experiments, we tested the interaction hypothesis under the constraint that (a) all students covered the same content during instruction, (b) the task domain was qualitative physics, (c) (...) the instruction was in natural language as opposed to mathematical or other formal languages, and (d) the instruction conformed with a widely observed pattern in human tutoring: Graesser, Person, and Magliano's 5‐step frame. In the experiments, we compared 2 kinds of human tutoring (spoken and computer mediated) with 2 kinds of natural‐language‐based computer tutoring (Why2‐Atlas and Why2‐AutoTutor) and 3 control conditions that involved studying texts. The results depended on whether the students' preparation matched the content of the instruction. When novices (students who had not taken college physics) studied content that was written for intermediates (students who had taken college physics), then tutorial dialogue was reliably more beneficial than less interactive instruction, with large effect sizes. When novices studied material written for novices or intermediates studied material written for intermediates, then tutorial dialogue was not reliably more effective than the text‐based control conditions. (shrink)

It is often assumed that engaging in a one‐on‐one dialogue with a tutor is more effective than listening to a lecture or reading a text. Although earlier experiments have not always supported this hypothesis, this may be due in part to allowing the tutors to cover different content than the noninteractive instruction. In 7 experiments, we tested the interaction hypothesis under the constraint that (a) all students covered the same content during instruction, (b) the task domain was qualitative physics, (c) (...) the instruction was in natural language as opposed to mathematical or other formal languages, and (d) the instruction conformed with a widely observed pattern in human tutoring: Graesser, Person, and Magliano's 5‐step frame. In the experiments, we compared 2 kinds of human tutoring (spoken and computer mediated) with 2 kinds of natural‐language‐based computer tutoring (Why2‐Atlas and Why2‐AutoTutor) and 3 control conditions that involved studying texts. The results depended on whether the students' preparation matched the content of the instruction. When novices (students who had not taken college physics) studied content that was written for intermediates (students who had taken college physics), then tutorial dialogue was reliably more beneficial than less interactive instruction, with large effect sizes. When novices studied material written for novices or intermediates studied material written for intermediates, then tutorial dialogue was not reliably more effective than the text‐based control conditions. (shrink)

It is often assumed that engaging in a one‐on‐one dialogue with a tutor is more effective than listening to a lecture or reading a text. Although earlier experiments have not always supported this hypothesis, this may be due in part to allowing the tutors to cover different content than the noninteractive instruction. In 7 experiments, we tested the interaction hypothesis under the constraint that (a) all students covered the same content during instruction, (b) the task domain was qualitative physics, (c) (...) the instruction was in natural language as opposed to mathematical or other formal languages, and (d) the instruction conformed with a widely observed pattern in human tutoring: Graesser, Person, and Magliano's 5‐step frame. In the experiments, we compared 2 kinds of human tutoring (spoken and computer mediated) with 2 kinds of natural‐language‐based computer tutoring (Why2‐Atlas and Why2‐AutoTutor) and 3 control conditions that involved studying texts. The results depended on whether the students' preparation matched the content of the instruction. When novices (students who had not taken college physics) studied content that was written for intermediates (students who had taken college physics), then tutorial dialogue was reliably more beneficial than less interactive instruction, with large effect sizes. When novices studied material written for novices or intermediates studied material written for intermediates, then tutorial dialogue was not reliably more effective than the text‐based control conditions. (shrink)

Ethical leadership research has primarily relied on social learning and social exchange theories. Although these theories have been generative, additional theoretical perspectives hold the potential to broaden scholars’ understanding of ethical leadership’s effects. In this paper, we examine moral typecasting theory and its unique implications for followers’ leader-directed citizenship behavior. Across two studies employing both survey-based and experimental methods, we offer support for three key predictions consistent with this theory. First, the effect of ethical leadership on leader-directed citizenship behavior is (...) curvilinear, with followers helping highly ethical and highly unethical leaders the least. Second, this effect only emerges in morally intense contexts. Third, this effect is mediated by the follower’s belief in the potential for prosocial impact. Our findings suggest that a follower’s belief that his or her leader is ethical has meaningful, often counterintuitive effects that are not predicted by dominant theories of ethical leadership. These results highlight the potential importance of moral typecasting theory to better understand the dynamics of ethical leadership. (shrink)

The Monographs produced by the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) apply rigorous procedures for the scientific review and evaluation of carcinogenic hazards by independent experts. The Preamble to the IARC Monographs, which outlines these procedures, was updated in 2019, following recommendations of a 2018 expert Advisory Group. This article presents the key features of the updated Preamble, a major milestone that will enable IARC to take advantage of recent scientific and procedural advances made during the 12 years since (...) the last Preamble amendments. The updated Preamble formalizes important developments already being pioneered in the Monographs Programme. These developments were taken forward in a clarified and strengthened process for identifying, reviewing, evaluating and integrating evidence to identify causes of human cancer. The advancements adopted include strengthening of systematic review methodologies; greater emphasis on mechanistic evidence, based on key characteristics of carcinogens; greater consideration of quality and informativeness in the critical evaluation of epidemiological studies, including their exposure assessment methods; improved harmonization of evaluation criteria for the different evidence streams; and a single-step process of integrating evidence on cancer in humans, cancer in experimental animals and mechanisms for reaching overall evaluations. In all, the updated Preamble underpins a stronger and more transparent method for the identification of carcinogenic hazards, the essential first step in cancer prevention. (shrink)

Die Aussagen der Konfirmanden habe ich, wie im Anfang bereits erwähnt, in verschiedene Sachgebiete aufgeteilt. Die aufgeführten Aussagen stehen für eine Reihe von Konfirmanden, die hinsichtlich der Sachgebiete in übereinstimmender Weise reagiert haben. Zu A) Zweifel an der Existenz Gottes Der auf die Realität des konkreten Alltags ausgerichtete Konfirmand vermißt eine sichtbare und greifbare Offenbarung Gottes. Der Glaube ist noch nicht gefestigt genug, um an den unsichtbaren Gott, an seinem Wort Halt zu finden. Diese Kinder erhoffen, daß Gott doch für (...) sie da ist, auch wenn sie noch nicht glauben können, nicht im Glauben Gottes Gegenwart erfahren. Anstoß und Ärgernis ruft die als unverständlich gewertete Ausdrucksweise der Bibel hervor, die ihnen Gottes Nähe eher verdunkelt, anstatt zu erhellen. Zu B) Sinn des Leides und Leidens Leid und Leiden sind schon recht verständig eingeordnet in den Heilsplan Gottes mit den Menschen im Erdendasein. Es wird als eindringlicher Fingerzeig auf die Führung und Fügung Gottes angesehen, als eine Wegweisung aus der Anonymität kirchlicher Gleichgültigkeit in die persönliche Nähe Gottes und ehrfürchtige Anbetung seines Namens. Sie sehen es auch an als eine Prüfung der Glaubensstärke und Beständigkeit. Zu C) Existenzielle Wandlung durch Gottes Wort Das Vorbild, das "Fremderleben", die Erfahrung der Umkehr zum Glauben, erlebt am Mitmenschen, bewirkt bei den Konfirmanden eine Eigenbesinnung. Ob es sich um die innere Wandlung eines Religionslehrers, um die erreichte Gebetsfähigkeit eines Gliedes der Evgl. Jungschar oder um glaubenweckende Diskussionen innerhalb der Konfirmandengemeinschaft handelt, spielt dabei keine Rolle. Zu D) Bekennen und Verleugnen Das persönliche Bekenntnis zum Christenglauben in der Öffentlichkeit wird, von Ausnahmen abgesehen, als undurchführbar abgelehnt. Der Verlust des Ansehens bei den Schulkameraden und Freunden wird als zu hoher Preis gegenüber dem Wert des öffentlichen Christusbekenntnisses eingeschätzt. Das Verhalten gegenüber spöttisch lachenden Kameraden bewegt sich zwischen Widerspruch, Mitmachen, einem Sich-still-Verhalten und einem Bedauern des Spötters bei den an sich glaubensernsten Konfirmanden. Zu Hause, abends in der Stille der Stube ohne Beisein Gleichaltriger kommt es zum Bekenntnis. Es ist neben der Bekenntnisscheu auch guter Vorsatz vorhanden, im Leben Halt im Glauben zu finden. Zu E) Der säkularisierte Mensch unserer Tage vergißt Gott Auch hier ist die Skala der Aussagen zwischen extremen Höhen- und Tiefpunkten von sehr kontrastierenden Auffassungen ausgefüllt. Einmal die Ablenkung des Menschen von Gott durch fortschreitende Technisierung und Automatisierung des alltäglichen Lebens - bis hin zum Götzendienst an einer verselbständigten, zur Allmacht erhobenen Technik! Daneben das Aufzeigen der Grenze zwischen menschlicher Ohnmacht und göttlicher Macht im Versagen menschlicher Erfindungen, wenn Gott es will! . Zu F) Stimme des Guten und Bösen im Gewissen Das schlechte Gewissen im Frühstadium des Glaubens hat noch Angst vor Strafe zum Inhalt, ist also ganz diesseitig bestimmt. Darum kann sich dann "in einer gewissen Kraft" von außen allmählich das göttliche Eingreifen manifestieren, und auch Mut machen zum öffentlichen Bekennen des begangenen Unrechts. Die psychische Entlastung und Erleichterung nach dem Schuldbekenntnis wirkt sich physisch aus: "als löse die Last der Sünde sich auf meinen Schultern auf"16. Neben der Angst vor Strafe findet sich auch die Erkenntnis: Strafe ist notwendig, damit Wiederholung von Unrecht vermieden werde. Wird alles mit dem Samtmäntelchen verzeihender Scheinliebe zugedeckt, kann es zur Nivellierung des Gewissens, zum Einschläfern seiner lebendigen Funktion führen. Zu G) Kritik am elterlichen Einsegnungsverständnis als traditionsgebundene, kirchlich-gesellschaftliche Verpflichtung Das nachdenkliche, für Glaubensfragen aufgeschlossene Konfirmandenkind spürt sehr bald, wenn die Eltern in der kirchlichen Erziehung inkonsequent sind, d. h. wenn sie die Zurüstung und die Konfirmation nur als eine äußere Form ansehen. Der Konflikt entsteht, wenn bei den Konfirmanden aufgrund von persönlichen Gruppengesprächen und Einzelgesprächen mit dem Pfarrer eine tiefere Bindung an Gottes Wort und Gemeinde sich anbahnt, die über die zwei Konfirmandenjahre hinausreicht. Hart stoßen sich die Gegensätze zwischen den Generationen: Das kirchlich-gesellschaftliche Verständnis von Unterricht und Einsegnung bei den Eltern- die geistlich ausgerichtete Kontaktsehnsucht nach bleibender Gemeinschaft in Gottes Wort und Kirche bei dem Konfirmandenkind. Zu H) Jesus als Nothelfer Neben Rettung vor dem Erstickungstod beim Bau einer unterirdischen Erdhöhle oder der Bewahrung eines Arbeiters vor einem tödlichen Betriebs-unfall in einer Gießerei, sind besonders eindrücklich die Glaubensaussagen der Konfirmandenkinder in der Kriegs- und unmittelbaren Nachkriegszeit. Der Schrecken des letzten Krieges, die Entbehrungen danach prägen sich hier im Bewußtsein der 14/15jährigen Konfirmanden sehr plastisch aus. Die Panik in einer Kohlengrube während eines Fliegerangriffes, der Mangel an Brot und Feuerung, die Bestürzung über den Verlust einer Lebensmittel-karte, und überall Jesus als Helfer, das ist sehr echt und realistisch dem Leben nachgebildet. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungDie Erkenntnistheorie der Wissenschaften ist als selbständige Wissenschaft nur zu begründen, wenn es gelingt, den Begriff der Wissenschaftlichkeit unabhängig von der Untersuchung der Wissenschaften im einzelnen zu bilden. Das ist die Aufgabe, die Wittgenstein in seinem Tractatus logico‐philosophicus zu lösen versuchte, nicht ohne dabei auch einiges Unerkennbare und Spekulative zu berühren. Die Bedeutung des Tractatus ist daher ohne den Begriff der Spekulation nicht zu klären. Die Spekulation und die Grenzen der Spekulation zu untersuchen, ist eine wesentliche vernünftige Aufgabe der Erkenntnistheorie. (...) Sie ist aktuell auch für die Erkenntnistheorie der exakten Wissenschaften, weil sich Physik und Spekulation direkt berühren und einige Physiker von Rang die Darstellung ihrer Wissenschaft kritiklos mit spekulativen Gedanken vermischen.RésuméL'épistémologie des sciences ne peut ětre fondée comme science indépendante que si l'on parvient à délimiter le domaine scientifique indépendamment de tout examen des sciences particulières. C'est le problème que Wittgenstein essaya de résoudre dans son traité logico‐philosophique, non sans d'ailleurs se heurter à quelques inconnaissables ni sans se permettre quelques spéculations. L'importance du » traité « ne peut done ětre dissociée du concept de spéculation. Etudier la spéculation et ses limites est un problème rationnel essentiel de la théorie de la connaissance. Elle est également actuelle pour l'épistémologie des sciences exactes, car physique et spéculation se touchent et quelques physiciens éminents mělent sans critique à l'exposé de leur science des idées spéculatives.A theory of knowledge can only exist as an independent philosophical discipline if we can establish a concept of scientific thought independently of an inquiry into individual sciences. This is the problem, which Wittgenstein tried to solve in his tractatus logico philosophicus, not without touching on some very speculative and unknowable things. For that reason, we cannot understand the significance of the tractatus without the idea of speculation. It is an essential and reasonable problem for the theory of knowledge to determine the nature and the limits of speculation. It is a relevant problem also for the theory of science, since physics and speculation have points of contact and some distinguished physicists have introduced speculative ideas uncritically into scientific exposition. (shrink)

In his later thought, Martin Heidegger disclaimed the possibility of a philosophical history of philosophy. In his view, the history of philosophy tends to remain bound to a specißc philosophical orientation and offer merely a philosophical position, not philosophy itself, presenting at best nothing more than an assemblage of doctrinal positions. In contrast, Heidegger developed in his early Freiburg lectures of 1919-1923 an historical-phenomenological program of philosophical history directed against the historical school of Dilthey, whose objekthi-storisch perspective he meant to (...) replace with his own vollzugshistorisch method. For Heidegger, there is no perfected subject at the basis of historical investigation, but rather it is the temporality of the observer which makes possible historical knowledge in the ßrst place. Heidegger's later abandonment of this notion is a significant reason for the lack of a philosophical approach to writing the history of philosophy after 1945 in Germany. (shrink)

Bu çalışmada, düşünme ile karşılaşmalar arasındaki içkin ilişkinin irdelenmesi amaçlanmaktadır. Karşılaşmalar içinden yaratıcı düşünmenin sahih bir analizini yapabilmek için, antik dönemden modern döneme kadar düşünce tarihi içinden bir güzergah izlenecektir. Bu anlamda, temel amaç olarak, içinde kritik düşünürlerin düşüncelerinin karşılaşarak hep biraz fazlasını açığa vurarak ilerlediği düşünsel bir patikanın izi sürülecektir. Buradaki, biraz fazlası ifadesi önemlidir. Çünkü o, biraz fazlası, kendini hep daha fazla kritik ve üretici karşılaşmalar içinden devam ettirmek isteyen yaratıcı düşünmenin edimsel gücüyle ilgilidir. Bunu açığa çıkarmak adına, (...) trajik diyaloglarda köklenen ve devam ederek Deleuze düşüncesine ve belki de ötesine uzanan eleştirel düşünmenin bir yolu takip edilecektir. Bu yönüyle, iki trajik yazar olan Sophocles ve Euripides’ in düşüncesinden, Nietzsche, Heidegger ve Deleuze düşüncesine kadar kritik düşünürler arasında gerçekleşen her bir kritik karşılaşmanın, yaratıcı düşünmenin edimsel gücü olarak kendini hep yeniden açığa vurduğu iddia edilecektir. Bu iddia ortaya konulurken, öznellik temelli ve akılcı bir eksende hareket eden ve yaratıcı düşünmenin gücünü zayıflatan geleneksel düşünce, Platon düşüncesi merkeze alınarak eleştirilecektir. (shrink)

Kurt Gödel’s version of the ontological argument was shown by J. Howard Sobel to be defective, but some plausible modifications in the argument result in a version which is immune to Sobel’s objection. A definition is suggested which permits the proof of some of Godel’s axioms.

When someone steps on your toe on purpose, it seems to hurt more than when the person does the same thing unintentionally. The physical parameters of the harm may not differ—your toe is flattened in both cases—but the psychological experience of pain is changed nonetheless. Intentional harms are premeditated by another person and have the specific purpose of causing pain. In a sense, intended harms are events initiated by one mind to communicate meaning (malice) to another, and this could shape (...) the recipient’s experience. This study examined whether self-reported pain is indeed higher when the events producing the pain are understood as intentionally (as opposed to unintentionally) caused by another person. Although pain was traditionally conceived to be solely physical in nature (Aydede, 2005), its experience varies substantially with psychological context. The placebo analgesia effect, for example, is the reduction of pain without a change in physical stimulation when context, expectations, or sugar pills challenge the interpretation of a sensation as painful (e.g., Fields, 2008). The nocebo effect, in turn, is the experience of pain without any physical stimulation—as when participants report headaches when told that a (nonexistent) electric current is passing through their heads (Schweiger & Parducci, 1981). These variations in pain experience seem to depend on the meaning of the stimulus: A sugar pill is meant to decrease pain, whereas electric current is meant to increase pain. In an interpersonal context, the meaning of an action is derived from the would complete. perceiver’s perceptions of the actor’s intention (Clark, 1996). (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Alfred Tarski Alonzo Church Kurt Gödel.

Introduction: What is the critical spirit?--Utopianism, ancient and modern, by M.I. Finley.--Primitive society in its many dimensions, by S. Diamond.--Manicheanism in the Enlightenment, by R.H. Popkin.--Schopenhauer today, by M. Horkheimer.--Beginning in Hegel and today, by K.H. Wolff.--The social history of ideas: Ernst Cassirer and after, by P. Gay.--Policies of violence, from Montesquieu to the Terrorist, by E.V. Walter.--Thirty-nine articles: toward a theory of social theory, by J.R. Seeley.--History as private enterprise, by H. Zinn.--From Socrates to Plato, by H. Meyerhoff.--Rational society (...) and irrational art, by H. Read.--The quest for the Grail; Wagner and Morris, by C.E. Schorske.--Valéry; Monsieur Teste, by L. Goldmann.--History and existentialism in Sartre, by L. Krieger.--German popular biographies; culture's bargain counter, by L. Lowenthal.--The Rechtsstaat as magic wall, by O. Kirchheimer. (shrink)

Bibliographical footnotes. Introduction: What is the critical spirit?--Utopianism, ancient and modern, by M.I. Finley.--Primitive society in its many dimensions, by S. Diamond.--Manicheanism in the Enlightenment, by R.H. Popkin.--Schopenhauer today, by M. Horkheimer.--Beginning in Hegel and today, by K.H. Wolff.--The social history of ideas: Ernst Cassirer and after, by P. Gay.--Policies of violence, from Montesquieu to the Terrorist, by E.V. Walter.--Thirty-nine articles: toward a theory of social theory, by J.R. Seeley.--History as private enterprise, by H. Zinn.--From Socrates to Plato, by H. (...) Meyerhoff.--Rational society and irrational art, by H. Read.--The quest for the Grail; Wagner and Morris, by C.E. Schorske.--ValeÌ ry; Monsieur Teste, by L. Goldmann.--History and existentialism in Sartre, by L. Krieger.--German popular biographies; culture's bargain counter, by L. Lowenthal.--The Rechtsstaat as magic wall, by O. Kirchheimer. Revolution from above: some notes on the decision to collectivize Soviet agriculture, by E.H. Carr.--Winston Churchill, power politician and counter revolutionary, by A.J. Mayer.--Brahmins and business, 1870-1914; a hypothesis on the social basis of success in American history, by G. Kolko.--On the limits of professional thought, by M.R. Stein.--The limits of integration, by P. Mattick.--The society nobody wants; a look beyond Marxism and liberalism.--Marcuse as teacher, by W. Leiss, J.D. Ober and E. Sherover.--Marcuse bibliography, by W. Leiss, J.D. Ober and E. Sherover (p. 427-433). (shrink)

Im Zuge der fortschreitenden Globalisierung der Wirtschaft kooperieren Wirtschaftsakteure immer häufiger mit Partnern in anderen Teilen der Welt, die anderen kulturellen Rahmenbedingungen verpflichtet sind. Dabei treten oft Handlungs- und Normkonflikte auf. Das vorliegende Buch behandelt diese transkulturellen Wertekonflikte aus unterschiedlichen philosophischen und wirtschaftsethischen Perspektiven: Grundsatzfragen der Transkulturalität, wie die Gefahr des Verlusts des Fremden werden ebenso behandelt wie der mögliche Umgang mit transkulturellen Wertekonflikten oder die Frage nach einer ökonomischen Moral. Ein besonderer Schwerpunkt wird auf den Aspekt des Kulturwandels und (...) des Kulturrelativismus gelegt. Konkrete Beispiele und empirische Studienergebnisse, etwa zu den deutsch-russischen Wirtschaftsbeziehungen, der Wirtschaft in Südkorea oder den Wertedifferenzen in einem multinationalen Unternehmen machen die Beiträge auch für die wirtschaftsethische Praxis relevant. TOC:K. Röttgers: Der Verlust des Fremden.- C. Hubig: Transkulturelle Wertkonflikte im Spannungsfeld zwischen abstrakter Harmonisierung und Anwendungsdissensen.- H. Busche: Was sind transkulturelle Wertekonflikte? Und inwieweit sind sie lösbar?- P. Koslowski: Wirtschaft als Kultur.- B.P. Priddat: Modernisierung einer Relation: Ökonomie/Moral.- J. Wieland: Die Governance kultureller Diversifität. Resultate einer empirischen Studie über die Bedeutung von Werten in deutsch-russischen Unternehmensbeziehungen.- J. Meran: In the long run we all become Americans. Anmerkungen zum Kulturwandel der Multis.- R. Manstetten/M.-Y. Lee: Zugehörigkeit, Verschuldung und Vermittlung. Zur Ordnung wirtschaftlicher Beziehungen in Südkorea.- M. Kettner: Kultur, Kulturrelativität, Kulturrelativismus. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungIn einem typenfreien formalen System, das widerspruchsfrei ist und alle Begriffe der klassischen Mathematik darzustellen vermag, können nicht alle Gesetze der klassischen Aussagenlogik gelten. Es entsteht daher das Problem, die aussagenlogischen Eigenschaften formaler Systeme allgemein zu untersuchen. Unter gewissen Voraussetzungen in aussagenlogischer Hinsicht wird die « aussagenlogische Vollständigkeit » und die « aussagenlogische Widerspruchsfreiheit » eines formalen Systems durch das Tertium non datur beziehungsweise durch die Schlussregel des Ex falso quodlibet charakterisiert. Es werden Entscheidungsverfahren für diejenigen syntaktischen Schlussregeln entwickelt, die (...) unter den vorliegenden aussagenlogischen Voraus‐setzungen in jedem formalen System beziehungsweise in jedem aussagen‐logisch vollständigen formalen System beziehungsweise in jedem aussagen‐logisch widerspruchsfreien formalen System gelten.RésuméDans un système formel sans types sans contradictions et qui pent représenter toutes les notions des mathkmatiques classiques, toutes les lois de la logiqrie propositionelle classique ne peuvent pas êvalables. C'est de là que s'ensuit le problème de discuter généralement les propriétés des systèmes formels en ce qu'elles concernent la logique des propositions. Sous certaines suppositions à I'Cgard des expressions propositionelles le « complet propositionel » et la « non‐contradiction propositionelle » se caractérisent par le tertium non datur ou plutôt par la rkgle d'inférence du ex falso quodlibet. On développe des méthodes de décision pour ces règles d'inférence syntactiques qui sont valables dans chaque système formel sous les suppositions données et pour ces régles d'inférence qui sont valables dans chaque système complet ou consistarit au point de vue de la logiqire des propositions.In a formal system without types which contains no contradictions and is able to represent all notions of classical mathematics, all the laws of classical propositional calculus cannot be valid. From this fact ensues the problem generally to explore the properties of formal systems from the point of view of the propositional calculus. Under certain assumptions conrerninq the propositional expressions the « propositional completeness » and the « propositional consistency » of a formal system is characterized through the tertium Ron datur, respectively through the inference rule of the ex falso quodlibet. There are decision procedures for the syntactical inference rules which in every formal system are valid under the given assumptions and for the syntactical inference rules of every formal system which is complete or consistent with respect to the propositional calculus. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume Studies Volume 32, Number 1, April 2006, pp. 113-117 How Wide Is Hume's Circle? (A question raised by the exchange between Erin I. Kelly and Louis E. Loeb, Hume Studies, November 2004) ANNETTE C. BAIER Hume's version, in An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, section 9,2 of the viewpoint from which moral assessments are made, and from which traits are recognized as virtues or vices, is that (...) it is one which activates a "universal principle of the human frame," the "principle of humanity." It displays "the force of many sympathies," and depends upon our possession of "some propensity to the good of mankind" (EPM 5.39; SBN 226). Does this represent a revision, on Hume's part, of his Treatise claim that sympathy with a person's "narrow circle" is what enables us to judge that person's moral goodness? A humanity-wide circle is scarcely "narrow," even if it is not wide enough for those who see our treatment of animals as relevant to our moral merit or demerit. The claim about sympathy with the narrow circle is made in the Treatise section "Of goodness and benevolence."3 It has recently been assuming the status of a definition of the Humean moral point of view, in some commentators' writings.4 If it had been so intended, then there would indeed be a revision in EPM, where there is no mention of narrow circles, merely two footnotes, 22 and 25, to the section "Why utility pleases," concerning the wisdom of confining our efforts to do good to those close to us, lest our efforts be "dissipated or lost for want of a properly limited object." But in fact Hume never claimed that sympathy with a Annette Baier formerly taught in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Pittsburgh, and is now retired. Email: ann.kurt@xtra.co.nz. 114 Annette C. Baier person's narrow circle was enough to enable us to recognize her bravery, her proper pride, her prudence, her good judgement, her wit, her integrity, her "justice" or her allegiance to lawful magistrates. It is needed only to judge her "goodness and benevolence. " (I take it that the title, "Of goodness and benevolence," is pleonastic, that the varieties of benevolence exhaust "goodness.") Just as benevolence is not the whole of virtue, for Hume, nor is "goodness." The section in which he uses the phrase, "narrow circle," begins with an explicit limitation of what is there to be discussed: "Having thus explained that praise and approbation for everything we call great in human affections, we now proceed to give an account of their goodness..." (T 3.3.3.1; SBN 602). "Good" is not, for Hume, the most general term of moral approbation. Just as we can judge some to be "too intrepid" (an ingredient in "greatness of mind"), so we can judge some to be "too good" (EPM 7.22; SBN 259). Hume's most general terms of approbation are "meritorious" and "estimable." He uses "good" in a restricted sense, for a person's possession of the group of virtues that come under "benevolence." In the Treatise 3.3.3.15 (SBN 581-82), he speaks not of one moral point of view, but of "steady and generalpoinrs of view" (my emphasis), and it is possible, indeed plausible, that sympathy with circles of different widths will be needed to recognize different virtues and groups of virtues. For some, such as justice, "extensive sympathy" (T 3.3.1.23; SBN 586) is needed. For others, such as affability, and other aspects of "goodness," we sympathize with the effects of the person's character on a less extensive circle. A good person is affable, generous, and kind, does well as friend, as parent, as neighbor, as colleague, as employer. She does considerate and helpful things to those she encounters, both those close to her, friends, family, and work-mates, and also to those to whom she is not so close, such as the needy in her own community, to whom she may give employment, or charity. Hume uses other phrases in Treatise 3.3 which are sometimes taken to refer to the same... (shrink)